Mathias Wagner (Philips)

Preemptive Sidechannel Analysis of Smart Card and Passport Chips during the IC Design

Modern Smart Card ICs such as those used in the new electronic passport feature a wide range of countermeasures against so-called sidechannel attacks, where not a cryptographic algorithm or protocol is under attack, but rather the physical implementation of a cryptographic algorithm. The basic idea here is that - although cryptographically strong - an IC may still leak information when poorly designed, for instance by consuming a variable amount of power that depends on the secret information being processed. Using the concept of mathematical correlation functions, it may then be possible to process this information such that, e.g., a secret key can be retrieved, which is protecting an asset contained in the IC.

In this presentation we discuss ways to analyse countermeasures before the IC is actually being produced. For instance, using simulations of the power consumption it is possible to assess the quality of new countermeasures before they are being employed, "returning them to the designer", if they are found wanting. This approach guarantees a much higher level of confidence and reduces the risk of having to redesign an IC. It also helps in providing cost-efficient solutions.  

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Last Version - $Revision: 1.1 $ / $Date: 2006/05/16 13:50:39 $
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