Flavio Garcia (RU)

On the (in)security of widely-used contactless smartcards

Over the last few years, much attention has been paid to the (in)security of the cryptographic mechanisms used in contactless smartcards. Experience has shown that the secrecy of proprietary ciphers does not contribute to its cryptographic strength. Most notably the Mifare Classic, which has widespread application in public transport ticketing and access control systems, has been thoroughly broken in the last few years. Other prominent examples include KeeLoq and Hitag2 used in car keys and the CryptoRF used in access control and payment systems. This talk briefly summarizes the latest developments on this field, with focus on our own contribution. Then, we will show that the security of other widely-used smartcards proposed as a secure successor of the Mifare Classic provide no (significantly) better security.  

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Last Version - $Revision: 1.1 $ / $Date: 2005/10/26 19:49:10 $
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